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Naval War College Review, Summer 2020, Vol. 73, No. 3
 As the Trump administration assumed the reins of power in 2017 with the promise of a maritime revival, it took command of a USN surface fleet pri-
marily consisting of vessels designed during the Cold War. This fact is not sur-
prising, since ships’ life cycles can span many decades. The leadership of the Navy 
believes, perhaps rightly, that its Cold War–era surface fleet may be ill equipped 
to deal with myriad future threats on the high seas over the rest of a century that 
will be marked by near-peer competition. The new century promises a range of 
new hardware and technologies combining with different maritime strategies, 
operations, and tactics that could challenge U.S. primacy on the world’s oceans. 
For example, both China and Russia actively are pursuing maritime strategies 
involving the extensive use of land-based precision-strike complexes that feature 
long-range, accurate munitions and a new generation of digital sensors. China 
in particular has developed a new suite of “gray-zone” tactics that seek to test the 
limits of how states apply force on the high seas. These different strategies and 
tactics are integrating new weapons and technolo-
gies, ranging across accurate, long-range missiles 
launched from land, sea, and air; emerging cyber 
capabilities that potentially can disable critical 
parts of naval ships; small-boat swarms that can 
complicate countermeasures and targeting; and 
new systems yet to be fielded that integrate artificial 
intelligence, robotics, and modern manufacturing 
processes such as three-dimensional printing. 
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As Admiral John M. Richardson emphasized repeatedly when he was U.S. 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the Navy believes it may be falling behind its 
opponents at sea. Underlying Richardson’s disquiet was the assumption that time 
and fate are not necessarily on the Navy’s side—a view that American political 
leaders echoed consistently. After nearly two decades of antijihadist campaigns, 
there is a belief that in the digital age adversaries are adapting more quickly than 
the U.S. Navy, so it needs to innovate now—and fast—to keep pace with, let alone 
preserve any advantage over, its rivals. Richardson clearly believed that the Navy 
is entering a new adapt-react cycle with adversaries such as Russia and China, 
which informed his call for a twenty-first-century fleet redesign.1 The new cycle 
coincides with a shift in U.S. security strategy away from irregular warfare and 
terrorism back to the geopolitical competition reminiscent of earlier eras.2 
Admiral Richardson’s call for a reinvigorated fleet would not mean much 
without high-level political support, especially in Congress. Perhaps not coin-
cidentally, a number of recent studies (some of which the Navy funded) have 
recommended that the Navy increase the size of its surface fleet.3 Perhaps more 
importantly, there appears to be strong political support in Congress for the idea 
that the Navy should get bigger.4 Thus, at least three important sources of energy 
are in place with which to revitalize a twenty-first-century fleet: (1) a general 
recognition that adversaries are adapting quickly to challenge the United States 
on the high seas; (2) internal Navy emphasis on overhauling and expanding the 
fleet; and (3) political support to make available the funds necessary to pay for 
it. Even three such ingredients, however, do not ensure the success of the kind of 
naval revival the U.S. Navy has made previously at various points in its history. 
Most importantly, the Navy needs programs that will take a redesigned twenty-
first-century fleet from the drawing board to the production line.5 
As the Navy stands on the threshold of the largest naval buildup since the hal-
cyon John Lehman days in the Reagan administration, the irony of this situation 
is painfully apparent. Just as a consensus has emerged among stakeholders in the 
Department of Defense, the White House, and Congress that the Navy needs to 
increase its fleet from 308 to 355 ships, the Navy must address serious shortcom-
ings in its capacity to conceive, develop, and build ships fit for battle.6 Recent 
programs such as the littoral combat ship (LCS), the Zumwalt-class guided- 
missile destroyer, and the Ford-class aircraft carrier all have highlighted the 
Navy’s failure to produce innovative, affordable ships in the quantity and of the 
quality needed to configure a larger, redesigned fleet. Unless the Navy can address 
mistakes made in these programs it will have difficulty innovating as Richardson 
has suggested—with potentially disastrous consequences. This article argues 
that the Navy needs to examine critically its largely failed attempts at innovation 
during the post-1990s era if it is to meet its twenty-first-century challenges. 
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The article particularly focuses on the naval innovation cycle of the modern era, 
an era that flowed from the 1990s. This period featured the so-called revolution in 
military affairs (RMA) and the absence of near-peer competitors on the high seas 
in the wake of the 1990–91 Gulf War. Despite massive investments and the water-
fall of 1990s digital technologies, most observers would agree that the Navy has 
not been successful at generalizing innovations into a new fleet design. Attempts to 
introduce three important ship classes (the LCS, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, and 
the Ford-class carrier) have been nothing short of disastrous. The Navy intended 
that these ships would be cornerstones of the twenty-first-century fleet, but each 
ship class foundered, for a variety of reasons. The Navy gave up on purchasing its 
planned complement of LCSs and now is planning on decommissioning the first 
four ships in the class a decade early (opting for a new frigate instead); it stopped 
construction altogether on the Zumwalt-class destroyer; and the Ford-class carrier 
program remains mired in technical problems, schedule delays, and cost overruns. 
This article addresses the U.S. Navy’s initial attempt to assemble a twenty-
first-century fleet. Starting, as it did, with the world’s largest and most combat-
effective navy, the United States, in its efforts to design, build, and field a fleet, 
provides the world’s best case study by which to examine the intersection of 
innovation, maritime strategy, and fleet design.7 The article nests the ongoing 
efforts to assemble a twenty-first-century fleet within cycles of naval innovation 
and maritime strategy over a period that, for purposes of this analysis, began in 
the 1880s and extends to the present. 
This article explores the reasons why the post-1990s innovation cycle failed 
to move the Navy successfully in the direction for which Admiral Richard-
son advocated. Identifying and addressing the causes of failure in the latest 
innovation cycle are critical if the Navy hopes to design and build a twenty-
first-century fleet successfully. If the problems of the post-1990s innovation 
cycle are not resolved the same mistakes likely will be repeated, catapulting 
the U.S. Navy into a dark future amid great-power competition; the Navy will 
be designing the future fleet continuously even as the present fleet continues 
its slow, expensive erosion. The result will be a future fleet design that remains 
an alluring, but ultimately a cursed, chimera—always offering a promise that 
cannot be realized, because of the array of impediments identified in this 
article. 
INNOVATION CYCLES—PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
Admiral Richardson’s call to focus on the future fleet is not new, but rather is a 
time-honored tradition for all militaries seeking to position themselves favorably 
to meet future strategic uncertainties. The Navy envisioned a redesigned twenty-
first-century fleet long before Richardson arrived on the scene. Ideas derived 
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in the 1990s called for development of a host of innovative platforms stuffed full 
of new technologies and advanced capabilities that were to form the basis of the 
twenty-first-century fleet. 
This article does not argue that the Navy has not introduced new operational 
concepts or integrated new, innovative capabilities into the fleet since the 1990s—
far from it. The Navy has digitized the existing fleet, adding new radars, sensors, 
communications equipment, and weapons to its existing ships, all of which have 
improved operational awareness and given crews afloat, as well as in the air, 
more-accurate, longer-range missiles to strike targets ashore and at sea. Looking 
to the future, it currently is experimenting with new operational concepts such as 
distributed maritime operations; launching programs to explore the possibilities 
that remotely piloted vessels offer; and introducing an array of new, digital-age 
technologies into the fleet that are meant to help win the next war on the high 
seas. Be that as it may, it still is hard to argue that the post-1990s innovation cycle 
has delivered fully on its promise of a twenty-first-century fleet design that looks 
dramatically different from that of the Cold War era. 
One can argue that there have been three major cycles of naval innovation, 
spanning the late nineteenth, the twentieth, and now the twenty-first centuries. 
These cycles had many characteristics in common: continuous and iterative 
changes to organizational structures to accommodate new equipment and new 
operational concepts; the integration of new technologies to improve capabilities; 
different platforms and new weapons; and the operational concepts behind these 
systems, which in turn drove manning and training so as to integrate all the above 
into an effective operational force. 
The glue binding these cycles together was the myriad organizations capable 
of generalizing the ideas and producing them in repeatable form—bureaucracies 
that successfully managed, and even directed, the innovation cycles.8 Indeed, a 
characteristic of the support bureaucracy is that it also changed during the in-
novation cycles, becoming ever more task specialized so it could manage the 
increasingly complex systems being fielded during the twentieth century. This 
task specialization has produced its own unintended consequences, as will be 
discussed later. 
The first cycle saw the rise of the new Navy in the 1880s, with a transition to 
the big-gun dreadnought and the airplane and aircraft carriers of World War II—a 
fifty-year endeavor. The second cycle extended through the end of the Cold War, 
featuring nuclear weapons and reactors, radars and other electronics, and long-
range missiles—a forty-year effort. Today we are in the midst of the third cycle, 
which began in the early 1990s under the rubric of the RMA.9 Defining these 
cycles as discrete, definable phenomena is a bit of scholarly artifice, since all the 
cycles overlapped in detail and were related to one another even as the geostrategic 
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/7
 RU S S E L L  6 3
circumstances surrounding the cycles shifted over time. For example, the field-
ing of the Aegis guided-missile cruisers in the 1980s represented a continuation 
of efforts to equip carrier battle groups with air-defense systems that could hit 
targets with greater accuracy and at far greater ranges in the face of Soviet tactics 
than initially had been the case when carrier battle groups were conceived during 
World War II. Another factor binding the cycles is the inherent nature of fleets 
themselves; they are composed of surface ships, submarines, and airplanes as the 
principal platforms. In the case of ships, their life cycles, stretching over many de-
cades, ensured that ships built to battle the Soviet fleet on the high seas continued 
patrolling the world’s oceans in the post–Cold War era; therefore, they performed 
a variety of different missions created by a new strategic environment, one of 
post-1991 strategic dominance and of post-2001 strikes against jihadi insurgents. 
Nonetheless, segregating these distinctive eras is useful for illustrative purposes 
to address the phenomenon of designing a twenty-first-century fleet—an activity 
that itself resulted from twentieth-century innovation cycles.10 
It is no coincidence that these three innovation cycles correspond to different 
eras of maritime strategy: the period of naval rivalry in the imperial age that began 
in the late nineteenth century and extended through the end of World War II; the 
Cold War, which pitted the United States and its allies against the Soviet Union on 
the high seas; and the post-1990 era that, until recently, saw the United States in 
its celebrated unipolar moment. During the 1990s, for example, the Cold War–era 
carrier battle group gradually was abandoned and carriers often operated essen-
tially independently, since such vessels faced no real threats on or under the water 
or from the skies. That has changed in the twenty-first century as states such as 
North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia aggressively have developed precision-strike 
complexes with land-based sensors and long-range ballistic missiles.11 A conclu-
sion of this article is that the conceptual drift in maritime strategy in the third 
cycle profoundly shaped the Navy’s initial attempts to design and build a twenty-
first-century fleet. 
Each of these innovation cycles introduced new capabilities and operating con-
cepts into the fleet. It is easy to forget, however, that each of the cycles was fueled 
by one important common denominator: money, as an expression of policy and 
legislative will. Without money, none of the innovation cycles could have been 
brought to fruition—another timeless truism, which speaks to enduring realities 
about how defense and arms work in American politics and the record of the U.S. 
Navy in modern history. A regrettable and potentially devastating feature of the 
modern era’s innovation cycle is a cost growth of ships, aircraft, and projectiles 
that is unsustainable, even given a U.S. defense budget that in 2018 was almost 
larger than the defense expenditures of the rest of the world combined. In addi-
tion to programmatic ship-construction problems, significant cost growth has 
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characterized virtually every major procurement program the Navy has under-
taken in the period. In short, the post–Cold War innovation cycle ran aground in 
the minefield of unacceptably high costs—even in a time when the defense budget 
topped $700 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2018.12 
The exemplar of this phenomenon is the $406 billion F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
program, currently estimated to be the most expensive weapons program in 
American history.13 Regrettably, the experience of the F-35 has proved emblematic 
for the Navy’s twenty-first-century fleet-design aspirations. The cost growth of 
air and sea platforms initially conceived in the 1990s has all but ensured that the 
Navy will be unable to field large numbers of the new Ford-class aircraft carriers, 
San Antonio–class amphibious transport dock LPD-17 ships, and Virginia- and 
Columbia-class submarines—all of which, like the LCS and DDX, were intended 
to be cornerstones of the twenty-first-century fleet. The Navy’s newly conceived 
FFG(X) guided-missile frigate is anticipated to cost nearly one billion dollars per 
vessel.14 The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the Navy would need 
an increase in its shipbuilding budget averaging 60 percent annually for the next 
thirty years to reach its desired end state of a fleet of 355 ships between 2035 and 
2047—which is significantly more than Congress has appropriated for shipbuild-
ing at any time over the last thirty years.15 An undeniable feature of the post–Cold 
War innovation cycle is that the Navy is pricing itself out of business with under-
funded shipbuilding plans—at a time when Russia and China are expanding the 
sizes of their respective fleets.16 
THE STRATEGY-INNOVATION NEXUS 
A purposeful adapt-react interaction between and among rivals drove the inno-
vation cycles of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as the Navy sought 
to lead its allies and keep ahead of its enemies. Cycles of action and reaction be-
tween adversaries are not new; indeed, they are a timeless feature of international 
politics. Early international relations theorists of the realist school noted that 
states seek armaments both to defend themselves and because they see them as 
a way to influence friends and adversaries.17 Like land and air forces, the navies 
of developed states inherently are nested within this larger phenomenon. Navy 
fleets historically have been deemed a vital, even a foundational, part of national 
power.18 This underlying tension of international politics produces a timeless rule 
applicable to these interactions: as nations arm themselves, they create insecurity 
in both friends and rivals, who then feel compelled to take corresponding actions, 
resulting in arms races.19 
Innovation by antagonists in arms races is a central feature of the phenom-
enon, as each participant strives to counter the capabilities of the other.20 Navies 
around the world went through such an adapt-react cycle in the dreadnought era. 
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It happened again in the aircraft carrier era in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury—a cycle in which the U.S. Navy undeniably came out on top of its enemies.21 
Importantly, these two adapt-react cycles occurred during an era (approximately 
1880–1990) in which strong navies were thought of as synonymous with national 
power. 
The experiences of World War II confirmed already-held beliefs about the 
importance of strong navies as instruments of national power and the strong 
influence that arms races had on the nature of the forces fielded on the high seas. 
During World War II, two types of maritime conflict unfolded, both of which 
were central to the Allied victory. In the Battle of the Atlantic, navies served in 
a more purely maritime role, in a context in which control over the seas enabled 
the application of force on land.22 Allied navies successfully overcame the U-boat 
challenge, moved the Army (and the Army Air Forces) across the Atlantic to 
Great Britain (as well as supplies to the Soviet Union and across the Mediterra-
nean to North Africa), and then managed to deliver the Army across the channel 
into Europe. In the Pacific theater, navies sailed close to shorelines to land troops 
and deliver fire directly onto the enemy, and they engaged in naval combat at sea 
among surface ships, as naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan had suggested they 
would.23 The Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944 was the largest sea battle in his-
tory, and it came on the heels of significant sea-based battles in the Coral Sea, at 
Midway, and elsewhere that have gained prominent places in the historical annals 
of the war in the Pacific. In both theaters, Atlantic and Pacific, navies correctly 
were seen as instrumental to the Allies’ ultimate victory in the greatest maritime 
campaign in history.24 
After World War II, the Cold War featured its own adapt-react cycle, in which 
the United States and its allies on one side and Soviet-bloc countries on the other 
moved through various attempts to gain and maintain the upper hand. As an ex-
ample of the cycle, the Soviet submarine buildup during the Cold War spurred the 
U.S. Navy to develop a formidable antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability that 
incorporated ships, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft, and a fixed sonar network 
on the ocean floor, not to mention several classes of nuclear attack submarines.25 
For both adversaries, a host of innovations appeared during the cycle. In the Cold 
War, the United States developed shipborne missile-launch systems (including 
deployment of tactical nuclear weapons at sea), in combination with radar, both to 
defend the fleet from new generations of Soviet aircraft and missiles and to attack 
targets at long range with sea-launched cruise missiles.26 Perhaps most significantly, 
the Navy deployed strategic nuclear missiles on submarines, stabilizing nuclear 
deterrence and the balance of terror. Importantly, these arms-race and innovation 
cycles depended on the ability of large institutions to produce generalizable innova-
tion—new capabilities that were introduced into the fleet on a widespread basis. 
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During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy’s missions expanded to focus on deterrence 
and supporting overseas military operations in Korea and Vietnam. In addition 
to these missions it fulfilled and interactions it had with adversaries, interservice 
rivalries represented another shaping factor in the Cold War innovation cycle. 
While the newly created Air Force received principal responsibility for deliver-
ing the strategic nuclear deterrent, the Navy decisively clawed back an important 
part of that mission through the Polaris and later the Trident submarine ballistic-
missile programs, beginning in the early 1960s.27 In this period, the Navy served 
as an important instrument of U.S. national power exercised under the strategy 
of containment. During the Cold War, the Navy operated at sea on a continuous 
and global basis, which established a concept of operations that continues to this 
day. In the 1980s, Navy Secretary John F. Lehman Jr. famously conceived of the 
Maritime Strategy to give the Navy an offensive strategic role in a potential war 
with the Soviet Union. The Maritime Strategy sought to take the war to the Kola 
Peninsula and the Soviet Pacific bases, to secure NATO’s northern flank in Scan-
dinavia and secure Japan, and to bottle up the Soviet navy with its submarine fleet 
in its northern bastions.28 Lehman’s concept simply repackaged a version of the 
Navy’s maritime contributions during the Pacific War, updating them by applying 
the same ideas to a European war with the Soviet Union. 
As had been the case in the era prior to and during World War II, Cold War 
assessments of adversary capabilities drove the Navy’s innovation efforts, with 
the bureaucracy operationalizing them into weapon-system requirements. Those 
assessments called for continuous iterative improvements in weapons, operating 
platforms, and operating concepts that were focused principally on defeating the 
adversary, both via direct confrontation at sea and by applying maritime power 
to support a land war. Despite civil-military tension and legislative rancor, the 
Defense Department bureaucracy operationalized these requirements success-
fully, for the most part, which ensured that Navy ships were equipped with newer, 
better radars; more-accurate, longer-range missiles; successively better jet aircraft; 
shipborne helicopters; and, for submarines, the capability to stay submerged for 
longer periods, resulting in greater stealth.29 With the support of Congress, the 
Navy procured, fielded, and—importantly—generalized throughout the fleet 
weapons, platforms, and technologies that were new, improved, or both. This 
description is not intended to romanticize a bygone era in any way; its intent 
simply is to emphasize that the bureaucracy successfully operationalized change, 
adaptation, and innovation that were linked to strategy, in the form of programs 
that delivered systems to the fleet. 
However, the strategy-innovation nexus that had functioned with a certain 
logic during the first two cycles entered a new period in the post-1990 era, with 
important consequences for the processes that had worked successfully in the first 
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two cycles. Following the first Gulf War in 1991 and a brief period of a “peace divi-
dend,” the Defense Department and its allies in Congress and industry success-
fully fought off attempts to reduce dramatically the defense budget and the size 
of the military departments. New planning and operational scenarios emerged in 
response to threats from “rogue states” such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea; this 
preserved force structures, missions, budgets, and programs. Attention focused 
particularly on such threats as the proliferation of chemical and biological weap-
ons as well as long-range missiles—threats that came not from near-peer competi-
tors but from weak states that chafed under a U.S.-led global order. As the 1990s 
progressed, the Defense Department moved away from specific war planning and 
eventually divorced the development of new weapons and operating concepts 
from those our enemies were developing. Instead, “capabilities portfolios” were 
emphasized, with risk trade-offs between the portfolios, to guide decision-making 
on what to develop and buy.30 This way of planning provided civilian decision 
makers with tools with which to evaluate the military departments’ choices on 
how to spend their money.31 
BUREAUCRACY AND INNOVATION 
To be successful, all innovation cycles in any military organization depend on 
bureaucracy—an organizational structure created to produce repeatable and 
predictable outputs, among other purposes. Bureaucracy has a well-deserved 
reputation for being resistant to change; in fact, it could be argued that bu-
reaucracy is designed to prevent change. For military organizations, repeatable 
output is a foundation of military effectiveness. Military organizations therefore 
are reluctant to abandon output, in the form of a practice in the field that has 
proved its worth. Conversely, however, it is equally the case that bureaucracy is 
instrumental to the process of change and innovation in military institutions. The 
tension between accepted practice and change sits at the heart of all questions of 
military innovation. 
A truism for all modern militaries is that bureaucracy effectively functions as a 
translation agent in the innovation process; it takes the ideas for change, then devel-
ops a kind of source code that allows each idea to be generalized in the ways initially 
envisioned. It falls to bureaucracy to manage the process of innovation and change. 
The bureaucracy’s source code for innovation comes in the form of research-and-
development (R&D) programs that mature into weapons-procurement programs 
and fielded systems, or as guidance that can change operational practice. To be 
completely successful, however, innovation cycles must reach the point of general-
izability, so the change can be adopted on an affordable, organization-wide basis. 
For all military organizations, including navies, the idea of generalizability is 
arguably the critical feature of efforts to innovate and produce new systems, new 
9
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operational routines, or both.32 As noted in the previous sections, during the 
Cold War the Navy successfully fielded new systems, built new organizations, 
and implemented new operational praxes. Many factors spurred the successful 
innovation cycle; one was a leadership that saw the potential of new systems, such 
as the nuclear-powered reactor for submarine propulsion, sea-launched ballistic 
and cruise missiles, radars capable of tracking multiple targets simultaneously, and 
missile-defense launch systems integrated on ships. These successful innovations 
also flowed from assessments of adversary capability, internal advocates within the 
organization who sought to develop a new theory of victory, a changing strategic 
environment that translated into a demand for new missions and capabilities, 
and interservice rivalries—whose existence is never to be gainsaid—that spurred 
organizations to propose new ideas and systems to preserve their missions and 
budgets.33 
Also worth noting is that during the Cold War the strategic and operational 
tasks facing the Navy and its force structure were relatively consistent with the uses 
of naval forces that had evolved over the course of the twentieth century. When 
the Soviet Union dissolved, however, the U.S. Navy found itself without a competi-
tor on the high seas. In the 1990s, the Navy realized it had to think about what it 
wanted its fleet to look like in the twenty-first century—a future that it would have 
to conceive of well before it could field a new fleet to operate in it. 
So during the ’90s the Navy began to plan to field a twenty-first-century 
fleet—for us today, the fleet of the present. In the ’90s the Navy envisioned a 
twenty-first-century fleet that would push the boundaries of its previous ship 
designs and incorporate a host of new capabilities enabled by the digital revolu-
tion. The Navy clearly wanted a twenty-first-century fleet that would incorporate 
the newest, most advanced technologies and operational concepts, which would 
preserve its leadership position well into the future. The digital revolution of 
the 1990s offered the Navy smaller, faster microprocessors that created a new 
generation of sensors and more-accurate, longer-range weapons and better 
intelligence capacities; real-time communications enabled via the Internet; en-
hanced situational awareness that promised to pierce the fog of movements at 
sea; and missile-defense systems to protect ships and shore-based installations. 
The hopefulness of the era of the RMA was not lost on the Navy (or the other 
military departments), which aggressively moved to operationalize its vision. 
Plans for a variety of new ship classes emerged during the period: the LPD-17 San 
Antonio–class amphibious transport dock, the SSN-774 Virginia-class nuclear 
attack submarine, two different variants of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyer 
(Flights I and II), the LCS, the Zumwalt-class destroyer, and the Ford-class carrier. 
What follows focuses on three of these programs: the LCS, the Zumwalt class, and 
the Ford class. 
10
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 3, Art. 7
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss3/7
 RU S S E L L  6 9
The Twenty-First-Century Fleet: Program “Highlights” 
This section briefly details the history of three ship-construction programs: the 
LCS, the DDX, and the Ford-class CVN. All were products of the 1990s-era in-
novation cycle. 
Both the LCS and DDX grew out of decisions the Navy made in 2001 to reorient 
an R&D program started in 1994 called the SC-21 program (from Surface Com-
batant for the 21st Century). The SC-21 program itself grew out of studies dating 
to the late 1980s that called for ships that could operate in the Norwegian Sea dur-
ing a potential war with the Soviet Union. The main idea was to develop a robust 
ship capable of attacking targets on land. The 1990s research programs focused 
on a number of vessel options, in sizes ranging up to forty thousand tons. One of 
its most celebrated proposals was the arsenal ship: a thirty-thousand-ton vessel 
stuffed with hundreds of cruise missiles and a vertical launch system. Then-CNO 
Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda championed the concept. Research efforts continued 
throughout the 1990s and up to the 2001 decision to proceed with two programs: 
the LCS and the DDX.34 
The LCS Program. The LCS program began in 2001; initial procurement occurred 
in 2005; yet as of mid-2019, the LCS has not been deployed to the field in support 
of combatant command requirements, owing to persistent technical problems.35 
The Navy intended to use the LCS as a smaller, multimission vessel that could take 
advantage of “plug and play” modules to perform a variety of different missions: 
ASW, mine countermeasures (MCM), and surface warfare against smaller vessels. 
Other relevant missions included maritime-security and maritime-partnering 
operations, surveillance and reconnaissance, and support to special operations 
forces. By mid-2018, thirty-five vessels had been procured from a program that 
initially was projected to produce over fifty. The program’s orders were divided 
between two contractors (Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics) that provided 
different hull designs.36 
Virtually every aspect of the LCS has drawn the ire of critics, from both inside 
and outside government: costs grew (from initial estimates of $220 million per 
vessel to $478 million); early versions of the ships suffered from construction 
problems; and development of the modules to support the three mission areas 
(ASW, MCM, and surface warfare) has been plagued by repeated and costly delays. 
In July 2018, the Pentagon’s inspector general stated that the Navy had declared 
the MCM module to be operational without demonstrating that it had fixed the 
known problems with it.37 The Navy subsequently abandoned the idea of swap-
ping out the mission modules and instead will equip each vessel with just one of 
the modules. Repeatedly the Navy has been forced to delay deployment plans for 
the vessels because of these technical problems. There also are persistent concerns 
about whether the ship is adequately armed—many doubt it can survive in combat. 
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In December 2016, the Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, J. 
Michael Gilmore, told lawmakers that the LCS had not demonstrated “effective 
warfighting capability in any of its originally envisioned missions: surface warfare 
(SUW); mine countermeasures (MCM); anti-submarine warfare (ASW).”38 
A year earlier, then–Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter ordered the Navy 
to reduce its program from fifty-two to forty vessels and to select a single con-
tractor to construct future vessels. Carter acerbically noted in his missive to the 
Navy: “For the last several years, the Department of the Navy has overemphasized 
resources used to incrementally increase total ship numbers at the expense of 
critically-needed investments in areas where our adversaries are not standing 
still, such as strike, ship survivability, electronic warfare, and other capabilities.”39 
Carter’s criticisms followed a similar brouhaha in 2014 in which then–Secretary of 
Defense Charles T. Hagel ordered the Navy to add armament to the LCS. The then 
Senate Armed Services Committee chairman (and former naval aviator) John S. 
McCain III (R-AZ) also was a frequent and scathing critic of the LCS from its earli-
est stages, repeatedly citing “fundamental shortcomings” in the whole program.40 
The program displayed a number of embarrassing technical problems, including 
hull cracks in the ship’s aluminum superstructure and a faulty propulsion system. 
Various vessels had to be towed back to port and, in one case, driven all the way 
across the Pacific Ocean for repairs.41 
In FY19, the Navy decided to stop procurement of the LCS and instead shift to 
procurement of a new frigate in FY20. In December 2019, the Navy announced 
that it proposed to retire the first four ships in the LCS class from service more 
than a decade early to save money.42 Current plans call for the Navy to build twenty 
of the new frigates.43 
The DDG-1000 Zumwalt-Class Destroyer. The story of the DDG-1000 program 
bears some similarity to that of the LCS—except that in some ways it is worse. The 
Navy initially conceived of the ship as the most technologically advanced ever to 
be built, one that would substitute for several ship classes, including destroyers 
and guided-missile cruisers. It originally was designed to support troops ashore 
with long-range, accurate fires, although since then the Navy has shifted the ship’s 
mission to one focusing on surface-fire support at sea. The first two ships were 
procured in FY06 and FY07. 
But less than three years after launching the program the Navy terminated 
the DDG-1000 program at three ships, proposing instead to purchase more Cold 
War–era DDG-51 Arleigh Burke–class destroyers. The Navy intended the DDG-
1000 to be a stealth ship, with a small-to-nonexistent radar cross section—the Na-
vy’s version of the Air Force’s F-117 stealth fighter. However, instead of becoming 
the basis (along with the LCS) for the twenty-first-century fleet, the DDG-1000 
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effectively became an expensive technology demonstrator platform. The Navy un-
derestimated the costs of the program by 47 percent, seeing its initial $8.9 billion 
per-ship estimate in FY09 grow to $13.1 billion in FY20.44 
The stealth ship was to run as quietly as a submarine; provide greatly improved 
battlespace awareness through new sensors; and deliver precise, long-range fires, 
via advanced, ship-based guns, to support troops ashore. The promise seemed sub-
stantial, boasting a first-of-its-kind integrated power system that would be powered 
by a new electric-drive propulsion system that would feed new, power-dependent, 
directed-energy and laser weapons. The ship’s modular Linux-based computing 
system, with six million lines of software code, was the first onboard computing 
environment with its own Internet system. The advanced gun system was to de-
liver precision, accurate fires with 155 mm long-range, land-attack projectiles at 
shore-based targets over a hundred miles away, drawing on an advanced, integrated 
combat system. The DDG-1000 was to have been supported by a crew of just under 
a hundred, as opposed to the 275 required to operate a Burke-class destroyer; the 
Navy subsequently walked back that initial claim to a crew size of 175.45 
The DDG-1000 reportedly does in fact have the radar cross section of a fishing 
boat. However, almost none of the other promised capabilities has yet been real-
ized, and, like the LCS, the ship has suffered persistent technical problems. 
The Ford-Class Carrier. Perhaps the centerpiece of the twenty-first-century fleet 
developed during the 1990s was a new generation of aircraft carriers, known as 
the Ford class, to replace the aging Nimitz-class fleet that began entering service 
in 1975. While it was based on the Nimitz-class hull, the Ford class sought to in-
corporate a number of important improvements that would enable the ships to 
launch more aircraft sorties (a bigger flight deck, additional electrical power for 
the ship’s systems) while lowering the number of sailors required to operate the 
ship by several hundred, which promised to reduce operating costs. The first ship, 
Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), was commissioned in July 2017 after procurement costs 
of approximately $13 billion. At least four carriers are to be procured; the Navy 
has estimated that the last ship in the class, CVN 81, will cost in excess of $15 bil-
lion. The first three ships in the class have seen their costs grow by an average of 
21 percent over initial estimates. The Navy has exceeded Congress’s cost caps on 
every ship in the program.46 
Three major new systems are being integrated into the Ford class: a new 
aircraft-catapult system called the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, a new 
aircraft-arresting system called the Advanced Arresting Gear, and a new radar 
known as dual-band radar. According to the Pentagon’s Office of the Director for 
Operational Test and Evaluation, all three systems have been plagued by schedule 
delays, cost growth, and reliability problems—which calls into question the ship’s 
ability to perform as advertised in combat.47 The office noted the following: 
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Poor or unknown reliability of the newly designed catapults, arresting gear, weapons 
elevators, and radar, which are all critical for flight operations, could affect the ability 
of CVN 78 to generate sorties, make the ship more vulnerable to attack, or create 
limitations during routine operations. The poor or unknown reliability of these criti-
cal subsystems is the most significant risk to CVN 78. Based on current reliability 
estimates, CVN 78 is unlikely to be able to conduct the type of high-intensity flight 
operations expected during wartime.48 
Frequent Ford-class critic and then–Senate Armed Services Committee chair-
man John McCain characterized the program as “one of the most spectacular 
acquisition debacles in recent memory.”49 
As McCain noted (and the Government Accountability Office echoed), the 
entire twenty-first-century Navy shipbuilding program, as highlighted in the case 
of the Ford class, suffered from a number of easily identifiable maladies:50 
• unrealistic business cases that invariably understated costs and underesti-
mated the difficulties of production that relied on unproven technologies, 
resulting in schedule delays 
• concurrent design and construction, without adequate testing 
• lack of testing (and a reluctance to test) to demonstrate advertised capabilities 
• new systems that were rushed into production despite the fact that they did 
not work 
• a bewildering mix of different organizations that were responsible for differ-
ent parts of the program, which made overall management accountability all 
but impossible51 
Teething pains are to be expected with any new platform or weapon system, 
particularly in the case of complex systems such as surface ships. Each of these 
three programs, however, fell prey to the same maladies that McCain noted. 
In short, the innovation process meant to operationalize these systems came 
unglued. The Navy actually recognized this; it curtailed the DDG-1000 program 
at three ships and canceled the LCS program halfway through its planned produc-
tion run, and the Ford class still faces significant hurdles to deliver on its promise. 
Explaining the Perfect Storm 
The innovation cycle of the 1990s produced these three flawed platforms, which 
represented the Navy’s initial attempt to conceptualize its twenty-first-century 
fleet. In the cases of the DDG-1000 and the LCS in particular, nothing quite 
like these platforms had been attempted ever before. Both represented aggres-
sive efforts at innovation that could have led to new generations of platforms 
that might have started the Navy down the path to its sought-after redesigned 
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twenty-first-century fleet. The Ford class represented more of an adaptation than 
an innovation (although several brand-new systems, such as the electric catapult, 
were introduced). Suffice it to say, if the Navy had succeeded in generalizing these 
platforms as initially envisioned, Admiral Richardson might not have felt com-
pelled to call for a redesigned twenty-first-century fleet. Identifying what went 
wrong with these programs in this innovation cycle is important if the Navy is 
to avoid repeating the mistakes of this first attempt to reconceptualize its fleet. 
Importantly, a lack of neither money nor political support doomed the pro-
grams; in fact, the situation was quite the opposite. Management within the Navy 
and the Pentagon, supported by their providers in Congress, kept hoping for 
success and threw ever-increasing amounts of money at the problematic systems. 
While it is true that the country and the Defense Department budget increasingly 
became focused on commitments associated with the post-9/11 irregular wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Navy’s requests for funding for its twenty-first-century 
fleet were met, even as costs ballooned and production delays mounted.52 
Choices made after the 1990s represent only part of the story. Just as important 
were choices not made that could have produced different innovation pathways. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Navy’s choices were shaped by institutional identity, 
institutional preferences, and intrabureaucratic communities (aviators, surface 
warfare officers, and submariners) that drove investment priorities in the innova-
tion cycle. For example, the attempt to build an invisible ship was not simply a 
matter of coincidence but instead reflected the preferences of the Navy’s power-
ful surface warfare community, which reside at the heart of the Navy’s strategic 
essence. The idea of an invisible/radar-deflecting ship represented an important 
attempt at innovation and appeared attractive for lots of obvious reasons. Such a 
capability certainly would give the United States an edge on the high seas over its 
adversaries, much as the Air Force’s development of its stealth fighter and bomber 
gave it similar advantages. The point here is that this choice of developing a stealth 
ship also was influenced by powerful institutional preferences. 
The preference for a manned aircraft may provide an even better example of 
innovation pathways not chosen.53 The 1990s delivered the era of unmanned 
systems now on display on a daily basis over America’s global battlefields—an in-
novation choice that the U.S. Air Force has embraced. In contrast, commitment 
to the F-35 represented the naval aviation community’s preference for a manned 
platform—which preserved the career track and influence of the community 
within the wider institution. 
Instead of developing a stealth ship, the Navy instead could have chosen to 
develop a stealth drone carrying multiple munitions launched off differently de-
signed ships. Such an investment almost certainly would have posed an engineer-
ing problem that was easier and cheaper to solve than building the stealth ship, the 
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Ford-class carrier, and the F-35. Instead, the Navy’s strike culture and commitment 
to carrier aviation clearly drove its investment strategy in favor of the F-35 aircraft 
and the Ford-class carrier. 
As institutional preferences drove the investment strategy, no outside coun-
tervailing force emerged across the civil-military divide to force a different set of 
choices on the Navy. Just as important, no intraorganizational advocates emerged 
in the period to challenge accepted institutional orthodoxies with a different the-
ory of victory that might have changed the organization’s investment priorities.54 
The point here is not to make a normative argument regarding the relative merits 
of manned versus unmanned systems; it is simply to observe that institutional 
preferences limited debate encompassing alternative theories of victory that could 
have produced different innovation pathways. 
When comparing the post-1990s cycle with those that preceded it, the obvious 
conclusion is that, in the cases of these three systems, the bureaucracy proved itself 
unable to generalize the innovations into executable programs. Bureaucracy could 
not fix the shared programmatic flaw that resulted from the disparity between the 
speed of technological change and that of the Navy’s plodding acquisition system. 
It was clear that systems that in some cases took a decade or more to develop and 
field would find themselves out of date when they arrived in the fleet.55 Program 
managers and their supervisors understandably were reluctant to nail down sys-
tem requirements definitively, preferring instead to develop and build systems 
simultaneously so that, theoretically, the latest technological advances could be 
integrated into their platforms. But at least with regard to these three platforms, 
that approach proved disastrous. 
For its part, industry obliged customer preferences, then demanded ever-
increasing amounts of money to fix the flawed systems. A shrinking shipbuilding 
industrial base contributed to the debacles by limiting competition and alterna-
tives as program schedules slipped and costs mounted.56 For example, Huntington 
Ingalls Industries, headquartered in Newport News, Virginia, is today the only 
shipyard in the United States capable of building aircraft carriers such as the Ford 
class. 
In its quest to generalize the innovation, bureaucracy did adapt successfully to 
the ever-increasing complexity of the envisioned systems. Bureaucracy invariably 
brought about the task specialization within myriad organizations that was nec-
essary to build technical and management expertise in particular programmatic 
areas.57 However, that adaptation did not produce generalizable innovation but 
instead ever-more-complex organizations that complicated program oversight 
and execution. As the ship classes became more complicated technically, program 
responsibilities became diffused across myriad organizations. The creation of dif-
ferent task-specialized organizations created span-of-control problems that made 
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it difficult to synchronize and coordinate different program elements. In each of 
the three shipbuilding programs, vitally important systems grew disconnected 
from production schedules. Instead of one coherent program, ship construction 
became a process in which multiple specialized offices each managed different 
project elements. Senator McCain complained repeatedly about the many orga-
nizations that routinely appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
for hearings about the Navy’s shipbuilding program. As he noted, it meant that 
no single organization or person had overall responsibility for the program, and 
hence no accountability could be assigned. An exasperated McCain often com-
plained that nobody lost his job because nobody was held accountable.58 The 
bureaucratic enterprise meant to generalize the innovation had become too vast 
and complicated as a result of the demands the Navy placed on it. It provided only 
what the customer actually asked for. 
The bureaucracy’s struggles to generalize the innovation were known widely, 
by all the organizations in the chain of command. Management and oversight 
within the Navy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and 
Congress all failed to correct the sideward spiral of each program; instead these 
entities spent even more money, in the belief that the Navy would fix the problems. 
Principal-agent relations can explain part of the behavior of the various oversight 
layers and entities, but at the end of the day, as McCain emphasized, the entire 
management and oversight system—stretching from the Navy all the way to the 
halls of Congress—bore responsibility for the expensive acquisition disasters.59 
Another feature of the 1990s innovation cycle is that the platforms were con-
ceived initially during the 1990s—a period of conceptual drift in U.S. strategy 
following the Cold War. It is not that the Navy was not busy during the 1990s; 
far from it. It spent the decade chasing after pirates in various places, conduct-
ing humanitarian relief operations, enforcing the trade embargo against Saddam 
Hussein in the Persian Gulf, and helping to police the skies over Iraq in Operation 
SOUTHERN WATCH. The Navy promulgated a bevy of new documents designed 
to convince stakeholders of its continued relevance—and need for money—
pointing to its support of land forces and a host of other global constabulary mis-
sions.60 Importantly, over the decade, the Navy saw its fleet shrink by 40 percent, 
from 526 to 318 ships, and its personnel end strength decline from 570,000 to 
370,000.61 
While the Defense Department successfully beat back attempts at generalized 
disarmament, which had occurred in Europe, there was no way to gloss over the 
lack of strategic consensus driving the arm-train-equip enterprise for the military 
departments over the decade. Scenarios involving much weaker, so-called rogue 
states eventually were substituted for the threat from the Soviet Union as a reason 
to preserve programs and budgets. After the 1990–91 Gulf War and its swift and 
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purportedly decisive victory, the RMA offered obvious advantages, and the mili-
tary departments understandably seized on its promise to guarantee their superi-
ority over potential rivals. The RMA framed war as an engineering problem that 
could be solved through clever targeting with better, more-accurate, and longer-
range weapons supported by an ever-improving sensor suite that cleared away 
the fog of war as if by magic. The RMA offered the prospect of victory through 
target destruction via a new generation of digital sensors and long-range, accurate 
munitions—a mind-set that implicitly encouraged the Navy and the other services 
to bet on the next technological leap before definitively nailing down their system 
requirements. Weapon-system requirements gradually became divorced from 
specific enemy threats and instead migrated to anodyne portfolios of capabilities.62 
The conceptual drift in national strategy fell squarely into the Navy’s lap. The 
1990s saw questions implicitly raised about the strategic value of sea power that 
challenged foundational assumptions that navies were an instrumental compo-
nent of national power. In World War II, navies enabled land forces by shipping 
men and their equipment to the fight. In the post-1990s era, however, America’s 
land forces, instead of storming ashore, mostly flew in chartered commercial air-
liners to airports in countries near the combat areas. While carrier aviation indeed 
supported troops and operations ashore in Iraq and Afghanistan, the reality was 
(and remains) that most combat-related air missions could be launched more ef-
ficiently from land-based airfields in or near the war zones.63 The Navy insisted on 
supporting troops ashore and went to absurd lengths to deliver, such as launching 
planes off the coast of Pakistan and sending them, via multiple aerial refuelings, 
to linger in lengthy orbits over Afghanistan to support ground troops (making 
for missions that Navy pilots described as “eight hours of boredom and twenty 
seconds of terror”).64 
The institutional preference for—even insistence on—conducting manned 
strike operations ashore also profoundly shaped the decision to proceed with the 
new generation of Ford-class carriers, which in certain respects were meant to be 
the “supercarriers” of the twenty-first century. The Navy never considered viable 
alternatives to the Ford-class platform. Congress forced the Navy to study the idea 
of building more, smaller, cheaper carriers, as potential platforms for strike mis-
sions—an idea in which the Navy appears uninterested for the present.65 There is 
little doubt that the Navy remains slow off the mark to adopt unmanned systems, 
having missed a golden opportunity during the post-1990s innovation cycle to 
get ahead of its competitors. This constituted an enormous opportunity cost of 
a road not taken. As strategy scholar James J. Wirtz pointedly observed, “One 
wonders exactly what, if anything, will be flying from those Ford-class carriers 
in 2063 or whether or not they will be at sea at all. One also wonders why the 
Navy plans to maintain and grow its fleet of aircraft carriers even though piloted 
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combat aircraft are headed for obsolescence. After all, in 2063 aviators may not 
be allowed to drive themselves to an airport. Would humans really still be at the 
controls of a combat aircraft?”66 
The reluctance to embrace unmanned systems represents a critical missed 
opportunity of the post-1990s innovation cycle, but it is unsurprising in an in-
stitution whose identity is grounded strongly in its carrier aviation community. 
One can only hope that the Ford-class carriers and their F-35 aircraft do not turn 
into versions of the Iowa-class battleships of the last century, which were obsolete 
even as they arrived. 
Perhaps more basically, the Navy and its benefactors were unwilling to con-
front the uncomfortable reality of the post-1990s era: that unthreatened interna-
tional trade routes did not need navies to protect them; and that, in any case, they 
were growing so full of twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) traffic that no single 
actor could disrupt those routes significantly.67 Seaborne support for U.S. military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan represented a mere trickle added to existing 
traffic on the vast global seaborne highways. The net effect of this undeniable 
feature of a globalizing world undermined traditional twentieth-century notions 
of the direct linkage between America’s economic strength through trade and the 
Navy’s protection of trade routes. 
As in the Cold War era before it, in the 1990s the strategic backdrop framed 
the innovation cycle of the era. Yet given that the Navy of the 1990s lacked a 
near-peer competitor and faced pressure to shrink, it is not surprising that the 
innovation cycle took on a different character than had been the case during the 
Cold War. The service realized it had to do more with less, and understandably 
it viewed RMA-era technology as a way to square the circle. Absent the require-
ment to establish sea control to protect trade routes or to do battle on the high 
seas, the Navy gradually migrated to the idea that a central purpose of the fleet 
was to support operations ashore through strikes, in addition to close-to-shore 
maritime operations conducted to preserve freedom of maneuver. An original 
purpose of the DDG-1000 was to fire at targets ashore in support of troops, with 
the idea that the ships would have to sail relatively close to shore to do so. In 
2017, the Navy shifted the emphasis to shooting at other surface ships. The LCS 
focused on support operations close to shore to deal with enemy vessel swarms 
and mines, among other things. 
Unfortunately, even as the Navy struggled to operationalize these two innova-
tive new platforms, the strategic environment changed. The irony is that, while 
the United States focused on the inconclusive, irregular land wars in the Middle 
East and Afghanistan—in which indirect fire from Navy ships frankly was not rel-
evant—competitors emerged (or returned) with new capabilities to challenge the 
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Navy both at sea and in operations close to shore, via development of land-based 
antiship missiles that could overwhelm the fleet’s antimissile defenses. 
It is clear that the post-1990s innovation effort was shaped and disrupted by 
many different factors: 
• Bureaucratic and programmatic difficulties in bringing ideas from the draw-
ing board into being as actual systems that could be delivered to the fleet 
• An ever-widening chasm between ponderous ship-development and acquisi-
tion cycles and the pace of change in technologies 
• Management failures within the Navy that prevented the innovation cycle 
from moving at a predictable, affordable pace to deliver systems that worked 
as advertised 
• Failure of oversight bodies in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 
White House, and Congress to force the Navy into corrective actions that 
might have kept the innovation cycle on track 
• A lack of strategic consensus on the role of America’s armed forces, which 
left the Navy to its own devices in connecting its systems to a clearly defined 
maritime strategy or a compelling rationale for its existence; in the absence of 
a clearly defined strategy, the Navy gravitated to strike operations, including 
direct support of ground forces, missing the opportunity to explore whether 
cheaper unmanned systems could perform the same missions for less money 
• The shaping of the cycle by excessive cost growth at every step, which en-
sured (and still ensures) that budgets simply will not support the purchase 
of the proposed numbers of new ships, representing a disconnect of monu-
mental proportions and a failure to ground the innovation cycle in a coherent 
linkage of ends, ways, and means 
Action-reaction cycles remain a timeless feature within militaries—at least 
for those intent on staying ahead of their adversaries. The Navy faces significant 
hurdles to ensuring that the conceptual and systemic flaws that produced these 
three platforms during the 1990s are not repeated. In addition to these flaws, 
hanging over Richardson’s call for a redesigned fleet is the critical issue of money. 
Naval innovation cycles need money, and lots of it, and it is not clear that there is 
enough of it to go around, even in the United States.68 
All is not lost, however. Out of the ashes of the 1990s cycle can spring innova-
tive ideas, technologies, and concepts of operations that can be generalized for 
a redesigned fleet. Perhaps the technologies of the DDG-1000 can be adapted 
usefully and applied in different and more-workable ways on new platforms. The 
same holds true for the LCS. The Navy must sift through these ashes carefully to 
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glean the ideas and practices it should use as the basis for a redesigned fleet. This 
must start as an inherently intellectual exercise, which in itself requires the institu-
tion to be capable of conducting critical self-evaluation before it takes corrective 
action. 
Moreover, political and military leaders need to articulate clearly a set of stra-
tegic priorities that the bureaucracy and other stakeholders in the process can op-
erationalize into weapon systems. Admiral Richardson’s call to arms that focused 
the Navy on overcoming its enemies in war on the high seas indeed may have a 
galvanizing effect, producing a shortened, more sensible innovation cycle that the 
bureaucracy can generalize, leading to the sought-after, redesigned, twenty-first-
century fleet. 
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